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LITIGATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A DIVORCE ON STRATEGY 
 by Bryan Lucas 
 
Love is important! It doesn't matter who people love, as long as they are happy. 
Everyone should have the right to marry who he or she wants. You may not like 
two men being married, but for them, it's normal. My two dads should be able to 
be married and have the same rights as any married couple. How would you feel 
if you couldn't marry someone just because the government said you weren't 
allowed to? If I loved someone and wasn't allowed to marry them, I would be 
really sad. My family has taught me that even if you don't agree with someone, 




These are the words of the ten-year-old adopted daughter of two men named David and 
Lee. They live with her older brother, but they are not married, because they reside in Illinois, 
one of the 41 states where doing so is not recognized, or is explicitly prohibited by law. Lee’s 
father, Mike, wrote, “I want Lee and David to know their union will be honored as a marriage. I 
want personally to be able to refer to Lee's and David's union as a ‘marriage.’ I want to call 
David my ‘son-in-law.’ I sometimes call him that now, even though I know there is no ‘law’ that 
supports that statement. Most of all, I want the law to stop seeing my son as a second class 
citizen or his love as second class.”2 
These words are taken from an amicus brief filed by Parents, Family, and Friends of 
Lesbians and Gays to the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry, one of the primary cases to 
be addressed herein and a historical centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s 2012-2013 term. While 
of little legal significance, these personal reflections are of not only strategically valuable and 
surely cathartic for their authors, but important because they strike at a fundamental truth about 
the same-sex marriage debate; while the ramifications of this matter are discussed, seen, and 
heard on television, in Congress, and in the courts, those ramifications are felt by real same-sex 
couples and their families as they go about the business of daily life. Ongoing social and 
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empirical trends suggest that these real world ramifications have begun to permanently impact 
the way many Americans view the issue of same-sex marriage, leading many, particularly in 
younger generations, to view it as straightforwardly as the ten-year-old daughter of David and 
Lee. Conscious of these shifting sociopolitical dynamics, advocacy groups have increasingly 
brought attention to families like David and Lee’s, emphasizing the personal nature of marriage, 
the importance of love and equal treatment before the law, and the inherent similarity of David 
and Lee’s family to every other “normal” American family. While these groups often agree on 
these tactics, and on the ultimate goal of marriage equality, they have differed on how to litigate 
the matter of same-sex marriage; this paper will focus on that disagreement. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 On March 26 and March 27, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the cases of 
Hollingsworth v. Perry and United States v. Windsor, respectively, marking a historic moment 
both in American legal history and for the gay rights movement, as the first time the nation’s 
highest court directly heard arguments on the issue of same-sex marriage. As these cases worked 
their way through the courts, they predictably generated a tempest of political controversy 
between progressives, who view the cases as an important part of an ongoing movement for civil 
rights, and traditionalists, who view the lawsuits as the latest in a series of attacks on their 
conception of the institution of marriage. Less predictable, however, was the reaction of some 
GLBT organizations to the filing of the lawsuit by the plaintiffs in Perry. Indeed, organizations 
such as the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, as well as the Lambda Legal Defense 
Fund, both well-established in the field of GLBT litigation, have feared that Perry prematurely 
demanded too much of the federal court system, thus risking a potentially major setback in a 
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fight that had to that point executed a deliberate and coordinated strategy.
3
 These groups had 
been implementing strategic litigation that emphasized an incremental approach to achieving the 
goal of national recognition of same-sex marriage, and found the timing of Perry to be 
inconsistent with that methodology. In contrast with the more aggressive approach of Perry, 
Windsor and other cases challenging the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) on more limited 
grounds suit this incremental approach. 
 While these groups continue to unite in their resolute support for marriage equality, this 
strategic disagreement raises important questions about the current progress of the movement 
toward equal rights for same-sex couples and the direction of the effort moving forward. While 
prognosticating decisions of the nation’s highest court is often a fool’s venture, and it is 
impossible to know what conclusions the Court will reach this summer, exploring historical 
context, relevant jurisprudence, and social trends can provide some clues about what may inform 
their decision making process and, ultimately, the Court’s most likely decision or decisions. By 
exploring the Perry and Windsor cases within the context of the development of important gay 
rights jurisprudence, the gay rights movement in the United States, and recent trends in the same-
sex marriage debate, the disagreements regarding litigations strategy are thrown into sharp relief. 
As previously noted, some gay rights advocates have warned that aggressive litigation may be 
premature and damage a movement that has made substantial gains in recent years; others 
believe that aggressive litigation is needed now, because equality seems ripe for the taking, and 
civil rights are not always to be gained by patience. But how do these arguments compare to past 
moments of social change when the Court has been asked to resolve questions of deep cultural 
significance? Cases like Brown v. Board of Education
4
 and Roe v. Wade
5
 provide useful 
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comparisons, and also further questions. Advocates of an incremental approach to litigation 
might point to Brown as an example of such a strategy, whereas the more aggressive viewpoint 
could look to Roe. Should the Court proceed incrementally, providing same-sex couples with 
equal treatment in a similar manner as it did African-Americans between the Brown decision and 
its decision in Loving v. Virginia, the chance of “culture shock” may be less, but inequality will 
continue unabated for a substantial period of time. However, if the Court proceeds aggressively, 
in a manner similar to Roe, declaring marriage a constitutional right for same-sex couples, 
equality will become a present reality, but the traditionalist opposition may be emboldened for a 
much lengthier cultural battle than would otherwise have been necessary. With the stakes this 
high, not only as a matter of law and principle, but for their families, friends, and for themselves, 
marriage equality activists have differed on this matter despite their ultimate ideological unity.  
This is the complicated sociopolitical nexus though which this paper will explore the topic of 
same-sex marriage. 
II. THE WINDSOR CASE: INSIDERS USE AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH 
In 1963, Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer met for the first time in New York City, at a 
Greenwich Village restaurant called Portofino, a place that they had both heard was one of a few 
that was part of the safe “underground” network where the heavily stigmatized lesbian 
community could be open, away from an otherwise dangerous and prejudiced world.
6
 Edie has 
said this was a place you could “let yourself be gay.”7 Soon, the couple was in love, and Thea 
asked Edie to marry her, even though there was no place in the United States that gave any legal 
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recognition to such a relationship at the time.
8
 Fearing a ring might arouse suspicion, Edie wore a 
brooch instead; their engagement began in 1967.
9
 
In 1977, Thea was diagnosed with Progressive Multiple Sclerosis, or MS, a condition that 
would gradually and irreversibly cause damage to the central nervous system and lead to 
paralysis.
10
 In 1993, when New York began to recognize civil unions, Thea and Edie were 
among the first couples to have their relationship recognized, but they quickly realized 
incomparable this union was, in legal terms, to the institution of marriage.
11
 In 2007, they 
traveled to Canada, where they were finally married – after a 40 year engagement. This marriage 
was recognized as valid in New York State.
12
 
When Thea’s health condition worsened, and because many of the medical bills 
associated with Thea’s care had to be paid out-of-pocket, Edie and Thea made sure to engage in 
comprehensive financial planning.
13
 As a result, the couple knew that Edie would have to make a 
huge-lump sum payment to the IRS following Thea’s death due to the federal estate tax, a burden 
most widows or widowers avoid from the marital deduction, a benefit which Edie is not entitled 
to because the DOMA defines marriage as being “between a man and a woman” for the purposes 
of federal law.
14
 After two years as a married couple, Thea passed away on February 5, 2009.
15
 
Under 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a), a property passing from a decedent to their surviving spouse 
generally is not subjected to the federal estate tax.
16
 As the plaintiff’s complaint notes, Congress 
enacted this statute to ensure that property belonging to a marital unit remains within that marital 










 Complaint at 42, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:10CV08435) (citing 
Martinez v. County of Monroe 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (4
th








 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a). 
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unit, thus avoiding undue burdens placed on widows.
17
 However, same-sex couples are 
exclusively denied the benefits of this provision due to the effects of the DOMA. DOMA 
provides, in pertinent part: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, 
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 




Due to the IRS’ application of DOMA, Edie Windsor was denied the benefits of the estate tax 
marital deduction, in addition to a host of other federal benefits, simply because she was in a 
same-sex relationship and, as the her lawyers poignantly point out in her complaint in the District 
Court, had her name instead been “Theo,” no such problem would exist.19 Mrs. Windsor’s 
complaint argues that the federal government treats same-sex couples who are legally married 
differently than married heterosexual couples and, as a result, she was forced to pay $363,053.00 
more in federal estate taxes than a similar situated heterosexual widow would have had to pay 
and more than $600,000 in total, because she was not a federally recognized spouse who could 
inherit their apartment and vacation home tax free.
20
 Therefore, she argues, DOMA subjects her 
to discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation, subjected her to differential treatment in 




 In a fascinating example of shifting social and political opinion on the issue of same-sex 
marriage, the Obama administration, through Attorney General Eric Holder, issued a statement 
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regarding Windsor and another one of the many ongoing cases challenging DOMA, Pedersen v. 
Office of Personnel Management.
22
 In the letter, the Attorney General explained that President 
Obama and his administration had determined that, because sexual orientation is a suspect class, 
classifications based on that determinant should be subjected to heightened scrutiny when being 
reviewed under an equal protection analysis.
23
 Further, Mr. Holder explained that the 
administration had determined that DOMA was unconstitutional and that the administration 
would no longer actively defend it in court, although they would remain parties to the litigation 
and allow members of Congress interested in its defense to pursue that option.
24
 Soon after, the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), overseen by the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives, intervened in the case and signaled that they would be willing to defend DOMA 
in place of the Department of Justice.
25
 Though the executive branch advocating for application 
of heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against GLBT people is a tremendous victory for 
GLBT activists, the District Court took a less ambitious approach by limiting its decision to a 
rational basis review. First, the court explained that the equal protection requires the government 
to treat all similarly situated persons alike,
26
 therefore prohibiting government from drawing 
“distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate 
government interest.”27 Next, the court explained that there are, of course, exceptions to this rule, 
and the “paradigm of judicial restraint”28 is the rational basis review test which suggests that 
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 Press Release, House Leadership To Defend Discriminatory Law After President Called DOMA Unconstitutional, 
ACLU (April 18, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/house-representatives-seeks-intervene-bereaved-spouse-s-
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“statutory discrimination will be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may  be conceived to 
justify it.”29 
 Intermediated scrutiny, the court explained, is reserved for quasi-suspect classes and 
requires that a classification be “substantially related to a legitimate state interest.”30 For the final 
and most stringent category that the Obama administration recommended be applied, heightened 
scrutiny, the court said that it would apply to any classification that disadvantages a suspect class 
or impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental right
31
 and courts are required to determine 
whether or not a law under review is “precisely tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.”32 Intermediate scrutiny has been applied in the past to gender,33 whereas race has been 
subject to strict scrutiny.
34
 Judge Barbara S. Jones noted that, because heightened scrutiny 
demands such exacting investigation into the choices of the legislative branch of government, the 
Supreme Court has been reluctant to establish new suspect classes given deference to Congress 
and “respect for the separation of powers.”35 Despite arguments regarding the defining 
characteristics of a suspect class (history of discrimination, an immutable characteristic upon 
which the classification is drawn, political powerlessness, and a lack of any relationship between 
the characteristic in question and the class’s ability to perform or contribute to society), the court 
decided that there is little precedent to establish that homosexuals are a suspect class.
36
 
 However, Judge Jones goes on to note a distinction between “laws such as economic or 
tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational basis review which normally pass constitutional 
muster, and laws that exhibit a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, which receive a 
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more searching form or rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause,” 37 a concept 
that has been referred to as “rational basis with bite.”38 Regardless, Judge Jones concluded that 
DOMA’s section 3, the part in question, did not pass rational basis review and failed as a 
constitutional matter.
39
 Congress offered the following justifications at the time it enacted 
DOMA: (1) defending and nurturing the traditional institution of marriage; (2) promotion 
heterosexuality; (3) encouraging responsible procreation and childrearing; (4) preserving scarce 
government resources; and (5) defending traditional notions of morality.
40
 The court found no 
logical relationship between DOMA and the achievement of these goals and, therefore, that the 
statute was unconstitutional.
41
 Mrs. Windsor was awarded the full amount of her taxes plus 
interest, and the case moved into the appeals process.
42
 
 To allow for a smooth transition, the Department of Justice filed an appeal on behalf of 
BLAG and the House Republicans, even though they agreed with the outcome at the trial level. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court opinion, but 
held, as the first circuit court to do so,
43
 that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class and 
classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to intermediate scrutiny.
44
 The court 
held that the four factors that determine whether or not a class of people is a quasi-suspect class 
are met by homosexuals: 
                                                          
37
 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579-80 (2003)). 
38
 R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines 
Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 225, 238 (2002) (explaining that the Supreme Court has established a variety of rational basis standards of 
review, including the oft-discussed “rational basis with bite” standard of review). 
39








 David S. Kemp, The End of an Unjust Law: The Second Circuit Strikes Down DOMA and Sets the Stage for 
Supreme Court Review, VERDICT (October 22, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/10/22/the-end-of-an-unjust-law. 
44
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In this case, all four factors justify heightened scrutiny: A) homosexuals as a 
group have historically endured persecution and discrimination; B) homosexuality 
has no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; C) homosexuals are a 
discernible group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in 





The court elaborated the gays have clearly experienced discrimination in the United States since 
at least the 1920s and that being homosexual clearly has no impact on one’s individual ability to 
contribute productively to society.
46
 The court also explained that, while homosexuality is not 
always readily identifiable, and may be hidden, it is a trait that invites discrimination when it 
becomes manifest; that is to say, when it is exposed, it is a distinguishing characteristic by which 
legal rights are determined and discrimination may be experienced, as with the allocation of 
marriage licenses or benefits upon the death of one’s spouse, as in the case of Mrs. Windsor.47 
As for political power, the court explained that a group need not be entirely powerless to qualify 
for protection, and while it is clear that gays and lesbians have made strides in politics in recent 
years, they are still deeply underrepresented in the nation’s branches of government.48 The court 
noted that, “It is difficult to say whether homosexuals are under-represented in positions of 
power and authority without knowing their number relative to the heterosexual population.”49 
Wisely, they went on to note that, “the seemingly small number of acknowledged homosexuals 
so situated is attributable either to a hostility that excludes them or to a hostility that keeps their 
sexual preference private--which, for our purposes, amounts to much the same thing.”50 
 The court applied intermediate scrutiny rather concisely to find that DOMA was not 
substantially related to any legitimate state interest and ended its discussion of the matter with a 
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poignant rebuke of the traditionalist justification for state-sponsored discrimination against same-
sex couples: 
Our straightforward legal analysis sidesteps the fair point that same-sex marriage 
is unknown to history and tradition. But law (federal or state) is not concerned 
with holy matrimony. Government deals with marriage as a civil status – however 
fundamental – and New York has elected to extend that status to same-sex 
couples. A state may enforce and dissolve a couple’s marriage, but it cannot 




 In granting certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court asked the parties to brief and argue 
the following questions 1) whether section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection; 2) whether the government’s agreement with the Second Circuit’s 
decision deprived the Court of jurisdiction to hear the case; and 3) whether BLAG has standing 
to be involved in the case.
52
 Given the scope of the arguments in this case, it is easy to 
understand why advocates of an incremental approach to litigating the same-sex marriage issue 
have had little fuss over the case, although it may be surprising to note that Mrs. Windsor’s case 
was initially rejected by some major gay rights groups,
53
 although it is of course possible that 
this was for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that there are a great many 




 Nonetheless, the case fits neatly into the incremental approach. Even though it has risen 
quickly to the Supreme Court, the question is not necessarily a broad one – the Court is not being 
asked to provide a sweeping mandate for same-sex marriage in fifty states, it is merely being 
asked to strike down DOMA, a statute that was relatively controversial even when it was passed 
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in 1996 and is opposed by the President who signed it into law.
55
 The Court can do this with a 
narrow holding, perhaps inching the GLBT movement closer toward a broader same-sex 
marriage victory in five or ten years, but not forcing the hand of a Court that is perhaps not ready 
for a more aggressive decision. This, at least, would be the position of those advocating for a less 
aggressive approach than the path followed in the Perry case. 
 Regardless, the courts have thus far held in Edith Windsor’s favor, paving the way for a 
major victory in the movement for marriage equality and giving weight to the argument that 
Edie’s love for Thea has just as much intrinsic value as any other relationship.56 
III. THE PERRY CASE: OUTSIDERS USE AN AGGRESSIVE APPROACH 
In 2004, recently elected Mayor of San Francisco Gavin Newsom began issuing marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples.
57
 After the state Supreme Court issued a stay ordering that the City 
of San Francisco stop issuing licenses, Judge Richard Kramer of the San Francisco County 
Superior Court found that California’s ban on same-sex marriages was unconstitutional.58 Soon 
after, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the Superior Court, finding that strict scrutiny 
applied to the state’s discrimination against homosexuals in the marriage context, because 
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marriage was a fundamental right that could not be denied on the basis of sexual orientation, 
thereby striking down the relevant statutes.
59
 Same-sex marriage was legal in California for less 
than five months when Proposition 8 was passed on November 4, 2008 by a popular vote to 
amend California’s state constitution to expressly forbid it.60 Soon after, the Supreme Court of 
California held that the vote was constitutional, but that all the marriages taking place in 
California before the ban would remain valid.
61
 On May 23, 2009, Perry v. Schwarzenegger was 
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to challenge the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8 on behalf of two same-sex couples.
62
 
In this case, these couples are represented by a most unlikely pair of attorneys – David 
Boies and Theodore Olson – the latter a “conservative rainmaker” and Boies his ideological 
opposite – the  two having once been on opposite sides of the courtroom in Bush v. Gore,63 
which helped to determine the outcome of the 2000 presidential election.
64
 In their complaint in 
the trial court, the attorneys argued first that Proposition 8 substantially impaired plaintiffs' 
fundamental right to marry.
65
 Secondly, they argued that Proposition 8 is not narrowly tailored to 
further a compelling state interest, as the justifications given by the backers of Proposition 8 
(procreation, “responsible procreation,”66 tradition, recognition of California marriages by other 
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states, administrative convenience) were not legitimate, important, or compelling, and that 
Proposition 8 was not in any way sufficiently tailored to meet any such interest.
67
 Lastly, they 
argued that Proposition 8 violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
discriminated against gays and lesbians on the basis of their sexual orientation and their sex.
68
 
When Governor Schwarzenegger and his administration declined to defend Proposition 8 
against federal constitutional attack, intervening defendants involved with the movement to 
develop Proposition 8 in the first place stepped in to defend the law, giving the case its 
Hollingsworth name.
69
 In his opinion for the Northern District Court of California, Judge 
Vaughn Walker ruled that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.
70
 Judge Walker engaged in a full 
trial and had each side present comprehensive cases to establish a meticulous factual record upon 
which to base his conclusions.
71
 In his opinion, Judge Walker first focused on the concept of 
civil marriage.
72
 He emphasized that marriage has evolved over time to include greater respect 
for the female partner as well as different-race partners, but that the fundamental concept has 
always been a commitment between two people, and the resulting benefits to broader society and 
to potential children.
73
 Next, the court discussed the opposition’s arguments for treating gay 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
must take intentional, non-sexual action to become joint parents, such conduct [negates] the need 
for government involvement. States may assume that couples who by definition can acquire 
parental rights only through intentional conduct need no further societal…regulation – they are 
already focused on the consequences of their actions. It is where the parenting may be 
unintentional, where couples act impulsively while ignoring the consequences, that social ordering 
is necessary. 
67




 Michael Gardner, GOP Leader Reflects On His Tenure: State Senate’s Hollingsworth Forced Out of Office by 
Term Limits, U-T SAN DIEGO (November 13, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/nov/13/gop-
leader-reflects-on-his-tenure/. 
70
 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff'd sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
71
 Id. at 934. 
72
 Id. at 956. 
73
 Id. at 934. 
15 
 
couples differently before the law.
74
 The Judge found that being gay is not a choice, but it is in 
fact fundamental to one’s identity, and that same-sex couples have happy, satisfying 
relationships like opposite-sex couples, and form deep emotional bonds and strong commitments 
to their partners.
75
 The Judge also found that children benefit from these relationships, that same-
sex marriages have no impact on opposite-sex marriages, and that civil unions do not hold the 
same benefits as marriage.
76
 In a final area of factual findings, Judge Walker found that 
Proposition 8 was essentially the use of state power to legislate private moral views in a way that 
perpetuates stigmatization of gay people.
77
 Further, the Judge found that “religious beliefs that 
gay and lesbian relationships are sinful or inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and 
lesbians” and are based on false anti-gay stereotypes.78 
 In making his conclusions of law, Judge Walker found that same-sex couples have a right 
to marry in the same way that opposite-sex couples do and that the traditionalist argument that 
procreation is the central element of marriage is undermined by the fact that marriage has 
historically been about “the right to choose a spouse and, with mutual consent, join together and 
form a household.”79 Judge Walker found that Due Process was violated because the defenders 
of Proposition 8 did not give a legitimate, much less compelling, public policy justification for 
depriving gays of the right to marry.
80
 Domestic partnerships, he went on to say, do not satisfy 
this right to marry, as they exemplify the state’s true intention – denying same-sex couples the 
same legal recognition as opposite sex couples.
81
 Judge Walker also found that Proposition 8 
violated the equal protection clause, both on the basis of sex as a quasi-suspect class and on the 
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basis of sexual orientation, which he suggested was most likely a suspect classification, but he 
felt it unnecessary to decide in certain terms because Proposition 8 lacked even a rational basis.
82
 
He considered six justifications that had been offered by the defenders of Proposition 8 and 
found none of them sufficient to sustain the law – it was therefore unconstitutional under his 
decision, pending the appeals process.
83
 For those advocates of an incremental approach to gay 
rights litigation, this broad and sweeping, heavily fact-laden, and stare decisis intensive trial 
court decision raised the stakes even more, practically daring the relatively liberal Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to challenge the Supreme Court.
84
  
In the Ninth Circuit, Judge Reinhardt, writing for a court split 2-1 in favor of the 
plaintiffs, affirmed the trial court’s decision on much narrower grounds, perhaps himself 
agreeing that an incremental approach is called for and that the time has not yet come to 
challenge the Supreme Court to find a fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples.
85
 
Applying his decision only to California and Proposition 8 itself, he concluded that it is the fact 
that voters chose to eliminate an existing right to marry that is a constitutional violation of Equal 
Protection.
86
 In what has become a memorable line from his opinion, he wrote, “Proposition 8 
serves no purpose, and has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays 
and lesbians in California, and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as inferior 
to those of opposite-sex couples.”87 Using Romer v. Evans, as the precedential basis for the 
narrow conclusion that a right, once given, cannot be taken away, Judge Reinhardt states 
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concisely that, “The Constitution simply does not allow for laws of this sort.”88 He therefore has 
given the Supreme Court a moderate course by which to approach the case should they prefer to 
address the issue of same-sex marriage on a more incremental basis. 
IV. THE DISAGREEMENT 
In the middle of the marriage equality movement, there has been a strong and vocal group 
of advocates who have been critical of David Boies and Ted Olson’s approach in the Perry case 
as a prematurely aggressive attempt to litigate marriage as a fundamental right. The thought 
process from this particular vantage point is that, while the national climate has improved 
remarkably fast for the GLBT rights movement, and the marriage equality “moment” in U.S. 
history seems to be quickly approaching, a major loss in the Supreme Court could be a serious 
setback and delay that realization, particularly given the relative inexperience of these attorneys 
in this area of practice.
89
 Strident supporters of marriage equality, who have for decades 
explained that the Constitution provides a logical basis for a fundamental right to marry, do not 
disagree with these litigators in their legal arguments, and perhaps not with their passion and 
enthusiasm, but simply with their timing.
90
 William Eskridge has advocated for a continued 
incremental approach to this issue, citing the current conservative majority on the Supreme 
Court, their mixed record on gay rights, and the Court’s historical tendency to wait for a more 
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definitive national consensus on controversial issues before forcing its way in to the debate’s 
final stages.
91
 He notes:  
In the mid-1950s, when 30 states still had laws barring people of different races 
from marrying, the liberal Warren Court refused to overturn this blatant race 
discrimination. The court did not act until 1967, when only 17 states retained such 
laws. So long as interracial marriage intensely divided the country, the Warren 
Court was not prepared to insist upon a norm of equality. Would the current 




Eskridge goes on to argue that similar circumspection informed Thurgood Marshall when he was 
prosecuting civil rights claims through the 1940s and '50s – he did not begin his work in Brown 




 In fact, Eskridge’s opposition to a broad ruling in the Perry case was so strong, despite 
his long commitment to marriage equality, that he filed an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit in 
the Perry case advocating for a narrower holding than that of the District Court.
94
 When the 
Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the District Court on narrower grounds, limiting its decision to 
California and giving the Supreme Court a reasonable way to move forward, he applauded the 
court’s decision as both sound jurisprudence and sound politics.95 He argued that the Supreme 
Court’s inclination to wait for the sociopolitical dynamic to solidify is not only important for 
litigators to consider when implementing a strategy, but it may be good policy for the Supreme 
Court, and he used the current climate surrounding the same-sex marriage debate as an example: 
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The crusade against marriage equality for gays is still robust in the United States 
today. Only [nine states] and the District of Columbia now recognize same-sex 
marriage. More than forty states specifically forbid it, most as a matter of state 
constitutional law. Americans are evenly divided on the issue, and partisans on 
both sides have heated feelings. Under these circumstances, the federal judicial 
branch ought not to issue broad rulings that pretend to decide the issue once and 




Since that article was written, there has been some substantial change in the polling data, but the 
primary thrust of his argument remains, and many others have articulated similar views.
97
 To be 
clear, Eskridge has confidence in the inevitability of marriage equality but not in Olson and 
Boies’ timing or approach to achieving it. 
 Others, however, have been harshly critical of this incremental or “gradualist” approach 
to litigation strategy, suggesting that it is unfairly shrewd to gays and lesbians to a legal waiting 
game, wherein they are precluded from utilizing the legal system they have a right to be a part of, 
simply because particular segments of the legal community want to handle the nation’s highest 
court with kid gloves. One advocate of this more aggressive approach articulated it this way: 
As a basis for judicial inaction, overblown fears of socio-political backlash grow 
harder to defend with every passing month. Calls for the Court to cut this baby in 
half--or to ignore it or throw it out the window entirely – are thus out of step with 
evolving social mores and deeply offensive to anyone who resents the injustice of 
condemning gays and lesbians to an open-ended legal limbo. This is especially 
true for those of us who believe that same-sex relationships are as valuable as 
opposite-sex relationships wherever they happen to be found, and who see little 
virtue in forcing gays and lesbians from across the United States to accept only a 
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few geographic enclaves that recognize their rights while waiting for the rest of 




While the differences between progressives and traditionalists on the topic of same-sex 
marriage dominates, this internal disagreement is often overlooked because, in the end, all of 
these activists will work together and pool their efforts and resources to work toward the 
common goal of marriage equality. This strategic disagreement, nonetheless, asks important 
questions about which approach is more rational, how the Supreme Court might proceed, and 
where the marriage equality movement moves from there. 
V. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
ROE V. WADE 
As has become clear, advocates of either position often point to historical context, 
particularly Supreme Court jurisprudence, and related political and social dynamics, to provide 
support for their view on how litigators should proceed today. In Brown v. Board of Education,
99
 
the Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public education was unconstitutional, 
famously putting a beginning to the end of the Jim Crow era set in motion by their decision 
nearly 60 years earlier in Plessy v. Ferguson, relegating African-Americans to a life of “separate 
but equal.”100 In the lead up to Brown, Thurgood Marshall brought a number of student 
plaintiffs’ cases in the separate but equal context, but he “argued that it was unnecessary for the 
Court to hold segregation, per se, unconstitutional in order to grant the relief sought because, in 
each instance, separate but equal facilities had not been provided.”101 In a pure example of 
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Marshall implementing the incremental approach, during argument in the Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma
 102
 case, he was asked whether he was seeking a ruling on 
the validity of segregation, per se, and Marshall answered in the negative as a matter of strategy: 
“Marshall had already discussed this response with his legal staff and mentors. They all agreed 
that a ‘yes’ answer would be dangerously premature.”103 It is clear that Marshall and his legal 
team recognized that an incremental litigation strategy was essential to their overall goal of 
desegregation the schools and achieving broader civil rights victories, even though it meant that 
inequality would continue unabated in the daily lives of millions of Americans. 
In the decade following the Brown decision, the Court decided a number of other 
significant civil rights cases, and ended government approval of racial segregation in American 
daily life. However, it took the Court another 13 years to rule that laws banning interracial 
marriage were unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia,
104
 even though more than a dozen states 
repealed anti-miscegenation laws in the interstice.
105
 Perhaps because the Supreme Court was 
proceeding incrementally in light of growing racial tensions, the justices struck down a Florida 
prohibition on interracial cohabitation before wading into the issue of interracial marriage.
106
 
It took the seemingly innocent marriage of Mildred Loving, a woman of African and 
Native American descent, and Richard Loving, a white man, to finally bring the issue to the 
Supreme Court.
107
 After the couple married in Washington, D.C., they returned to Virginia and 
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were arrested, because interracial marriage was illegal in their home state.
108
 The trial judge 
explained that: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them 
on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be 
no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not 




Their attorney argued passionately before the Supreme Court, however, that the Lovings should 
be entitled to all the same rights and benefits that same-race couples are entitled to, and that 
finding anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional would afford them these protections.
110
 The 
Court wrote that, “There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of 
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”111 Elaborating 
on the fundamental importance of the institution of marriage in the scheme of liberty, Chief 
Justice Warren stated, “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men…marriage is one of the 
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”112 This language has 
been thrust into the spotlight once again as same-sex marriage litigators look to Loving as the 
primary jurisprudence that establishes not only that marriage is a fundamental right, necessary to 
a citizen’s pursuit of happiness, but withholding it on the basis of discrimination is unacceptable. 
The question is whether or not the Court will extend its reasoning in Loving and its equal 
protection jurisprudence to include protection for same-sex couples. The case is also useful in 
highlighting another example of incremental judicial action and the surrounding legislative and 
societal environment that influenced the decision making process of the Court. 













At the time of the Loving decision, seventeen states still enforced laws against interracial 
marriage. By 1972, five years after the Courts decision, 37% of Americans still supported anti-
miscegenation laws.
113
 While the decision made them unenforceable, many of these remaining 
states kept the laws “on the books” for decades. Alabama didn’t remove its law until a 2000 
popular amendment, 33 years after the Loving decision, and 40% of the electorate voted to keep 
the voided law,
114
 perhaps suggesting that, in some places, some progressive judicial actions are 
always aggressive.  
While Thurgood Marshall’s approach to civil rights litigation was ultimately successful, 
and the Lovings won their right to marry, supporters of a more aggressive litigation strategy 
would say that this process was too lengthy and may have forced African-Americans and 
interracial couples in many states to suffer the many burdens caused by discrimination for longer 
than necessary. These issues were deeply complex, of course, but particularly in the years 
between Brown and Loving, aggressive activists would have preferred a less wait and see 
approach.  
As an example of a more direct strategy, activists often point to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Roe v. Wade. First, it is important to acknowledge that the subject of abortion rights 
may not be viewed by all as a substantive or moral corollary to civil rights or same-sex marriage, 
but it is as another example of a subject rooted in a rich social and judicial history that informs 
modern litigation strategy. In 1973, the Court established a nationwide right to abortion through 
its landmark decision in Roe.
115
 At the time of this decision, abortion was fully illegal under all 
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circumstances in 30 states, legal under limited circumstances in 16, and only legal on demand in 
four states
116
 Between 1967 and the Roe decision, the country had seen some liberalization of 
abortion laws at the state level, as about one third of states liberalized or repealed their criminal 
abortion laws, starting with Colorado in 1967.
117
 As a result of this state liberalization and the 
decision in Roe, the country dramatically shifted away from near universal criminalization of 
abortion with limited exceptions in a few states to nationwide recognition of a right to abortion, 
all in a six year period.
118
 While this is certainly an example of aggressive litigation that 
prevailed, it is as yet unclear whether or not the social dynamics at work at the time of the 
Court’s decision in Roe are equivalent to those at work in the same-sex marriage context; would 
today’s Court make such an aggressive ruling given the current sociopolitical dynamic? Further, 
advocates of the incremental approach, though they would surely hope to see same-sex couples 
afforded equal rights as soon as possible, are wary of the potential setbacks to the GLBT 
community that might be caused by an overly ambitious decision by the Court. Incrementalists 
argue that one need not look any further than the deep political division that has been observed in 
the years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. 
Many news outlets, political commentators, and scholars have noted that one of the 
lasting legacies of Roe v. Wade is its divisive impact on the American political landscape.
119
 
Even Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, herself a well-known liberal judge and fierce 
advocate of women’s rights, has said that the Court’s decision, while legally correct, was 
potentially damaging in its timing, and that a more incremental development through the states 
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may have helped to avoid the political divisions that have become so entrenched in American 
politics, at least on this particular issue.
120
 She proposed that the Court could have limited their 
decision to the particular state statute in question, left the political process to further 
development in the states, and moved on to the broader question of a woman’s right to privacy 
nationwide at a later time.
121
 Speaking at a Columbia Law School symposium, she said: 
It's not that the judgment was wrong, but it moved too far too fast…the court made a 
decision that made every abortion law in the country invalid, even the most liberal. We'll 
never know whether I'm right or wrong…things might have turned out differently if the 




While it is unclear whether the lasting partisanship surrounding the abortion issue results from an 
inherent moral divisiveness or from the aggressiveness of the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 
there can be no doubt based on statistics alone that the decision has caused political embitterment 
and alienation. 
The polling data consistently shows that the Roe v. Wade decision, and the subject of 
abortion in general, continues to be extremely controversial and complicated within the 
American landscape. A Pew Research Center poll finds 63 percent of U.S. adults are opposed to 
overturning Roe, compared to 60 percent in 1992, a fairly static number over the course of 
twenty years, and a substantial majority of Americans still consider abortion to be “morally 
wrong.”123 A recent Gallup poll taking a measure of opinion on abortion shows that 52 percent of 
Americans think that the procedure should be legal under certain circumstances, 25 percent want 
it to be legal in all cases, and 20 percent think it should be illegal in all cases, which is a very 
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close breakdown to Gallup’s polling data in the 1970s.124 Beyond polling, the abortion issue has 
continued to be a controversial issue in the federal court system. Beginning with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,125 a more conservative Court has 
increasingly accepted greater state restrictions on access to abortions and a woman’s right to 
choose. Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
126
 the Court 
lowered the standard necessary to determine if a woman’s right to choose an abortion had been 
infringed upon to an assessment of whether or not an undue burden had been placed upon her by 
the state, further broadening the Court’s jurisprudence on abortion and, therefore, the ongoing 
debate in every state over what is and is not legal in terms of regulating abortions. Today, the 
abortion debate rages on over issues such as “partial-birth” or dilation and extraction abortions, 
pre-abortion ultrasounds, and laws that restrict abortions to before 20 weeks or earlier on the 
basis of the fetus potentially feeling pain, among countless other causes of controversy.
127
 In 
many respects, the development of abortion law is still ongoing in the states and, as a result, a 
fierce debate is raging on between pro-life and pro-choice advocates, whether they be women’s 
rights activists, members of religious groups or otherwise. Advocates of an aggressive litigation 
strategy in the same-sex marriage cases point out that the Roe v. Wade decision was far more of a 
“a bolt out of the blue” than a decision granting marriage rights to same-sex couples would be, 
mainly because they believe that the marriage equality movement has “ripened” more than the 
abortion issue had at the time of the Roe decision, and because all signs point to public 
acceptance of same-sex marriage progressing exponentially, in the same way public acceptance 
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for interracial marriage has.
128
 Additionally, they note that abortion is substantively an inherently 
different issue; those that are deeply opposed to abortion view it as murder, but, as one such 
advocate state it, “for the gay marriage opponent in, say, Mississippi, how will their lives change 
if the openly gay couple living down the street can now obtain a marriage license?”129 
In contrast, current data suggests that same-sex marriage is gaining increasing support in 
American society and will continue to do so exponentially in coming years, as the level of 
support among younger demographic groups is overwhelming. 
VI. SAME SEX-MARRIAGE AND SOCIETAL TRENDS 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic shift in public approval for same-sex marriage. 
A CBS News poll
130
 shows 53 percent in favor of same-sex marriage, while only 39% oppose its 
legalization; a Pew Research Center
131
 shows 49% in favor, 44% opposed; and a ABC 
News/Washington Post
132
 poll shows 58% in favor, 36% opposed. The CBS News poll finds that 
peoples between the ages of 18-29 support same-sex marriage overwhelmingly, by a margin of 
73 percent to 21 percent.
133
 In that age group, even a plurality of Republicans support marriage 
equality.
134
 Between the ages of 30 and 44, support still meets a substantial margin of 59 percent 
to 37 percent, and between the ages of 45 and 64, there is a tie at 46 percent in favor and 46 
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 Only those about 65 are statistically opposed as an age group, and they 
oppose by a margin of 52 to 35 percent.
136
 In the CBS poll, 33 percent of respondents indicated 
that they once held an opposing viewpoint, an example of how rapidly viewpoints have 
changed.
137
 These statistics suggest a major cultural shift in the last five years in particular, as the 
Pew Research Center found as recently as 2008 that 49 percent of Americans were opposed to 
same-sex marriage and 38 percent were in favor of its legalization.
138
 This broad public support 
has translated into a series of victories in states around country in recent years. 
Eight of the nine states that legally recognize same-sex marriage did so in the last five 
years; the only state to do so before that was Massachusetts in 2004. A landmark achievement in 
the marriage equality movement was when same-sex marriage was legalized in Maine, 
Maryland, and Washington – the first time that voters had approved of such a measure instead of 
courts. Washington D.C. has also legalized same-sex marriage. Eight states and Washington 
D.C. grant the equivalent of state-level spousal rights to same-sex couples, most of which were 
enacted since New Jersey legalized civil unions in 2007, although California’s domestic 
partnerships had been in effect since 1999.
139
 For the first time in U.S. history, a sitting President 
has endorsed same-sex marriage, as President Obama passionately stated in his second inaugural 
address that, “Our journey is not complete until our gay brothers and sisters are treated like 
anyone else under the law…for if we are truly created equal, then surely the love we commit to 
one another must be equal, as well.”140 The President himself had previously been opposed to 
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same-sex marriage, but he has openly discussed how his opinion has evolved in much the same 
way that many other American’s opinions have.141 Similarly, President Clinton142 and former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
143
, who remain incredibly high profile figures in American 
politics and daily life, and who both previously opposed same-sex marriage, have come out in 




The various amicus curiae that filed with the Supreme Court and lower courts in the 
Perry and Windsor cases are also as testament to the groundswell of societal support for same-
sex marriage. A litany of high profile Republicans, including Meg Whitman, John Huntsman, 
Christine Todd Whitman, and dozens more, argued in favor of marriage equality, bucking their 
party’s official position.145 Senator Rob Portman of Ohio, once considered a leading contender to 
be Mitt Romney’s running mate in the 2012 president elections, became the first sitting 
Republican senator to endorse same-sex marriage.
146
 He announced that he had come to realize 
that, after finding out his own son was gay, he wanted him to be able to have the same enjoyment 
and quality of life that he had: “We conservatives believe in personal liberty and minimal 
government interference in people’s lives. We also consider the family unit to be the 
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fundamental building block of society. We should encourage people to make long-term 
commitments to each other and build families, so as to foster strong, stable communities and 
promote personal responsibility.”147 Senator Portman experienced substantial praise from 
supporters of marriage equality, and a great deal of criticism from traditionalists.
148
 His evolution 
on the issue highlighted the fact that same-sex marriage, particularly as it continues to grow in 
support across demographic boundaries, has become a divisive issue within the Republican Party 
itself.
149
 Interestingly and importantly, polls are increasingly indicating that an enormous factor 
that is changing people’s beliefs on the subject of marriage is actually having personal 
relationships with gays and lesbians.
150
 Further amicus curiae show diverse and growing support 
for same-sex marriage, including a brief by dozens of prominent Fortune 500 companies,
151
 a 
brief by professional football players and major professional sports franchises,
152
 as well as 
major medical organizations and child advocacy groups such as the American Psychological 
Association, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the 
American Psychiatric Association, and the Adoption and Child Welfare Advocates.
153
 These 
organizations have presented important arguments to the Court, stating that the sociological, 
medical, and psychological communities have overwhelmingly concluded that “homosexuality is 
a normal expression of human sexuality, is generally not chosen, and is highly resistant to 
change,” that “gay men and lesbian women form stable, committed relationships that are 
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equivalent to heterosexual relationships in essential respects,” that, “the institution of marriage 
offers social, psychological, and health benefits that are denied to same-sex couples,” that, “the 
factors that affect the adjustment of children are not dependent on parental gender or sexual 
orientation,” and that there is no “scientific basis for concluding that gay and lesbian parents are 
any less fit or capable than heterosexual parents, or that their children are any less 
psychologically healthy.”154 The parties that support same-sex marriage from the perspective of 
social science are of particular importance, as they undermine many traditionalist arguments 
against marriage equality, and they are a very large part of the overall trend that the Court will be 
unable to ignore in evaluating its options in the Windsor and Perry cases. 
VII. THE COURT’S GLBT JURISPRUDENCE AND CURRENT OPTIONS 
In 1972, relatively soon after the Loving decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected 
a same-sex couple’s claim that the federal Constitution entitled them to marry.155 The Supreme 
Court dismissed an appeal of this case, Baker v. Nelson, “for want of a substantial federal 
question.”156 In a 1986 case reviewing a Georgia law classifying homosexual sexual activity as 
illegal “sodomy,” Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that there was no constitutionally 
protected right to engage in homosexual sex.
157
 Though these decisions were not friendly to the 
gay rights movement, the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved along with society and, in recent 
years, a number of decisions have been released that may have a very real impact on decision-
making in the marriage context.  
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Regulation of same-sex sexual activity is well-established in American history, and the 
Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas finding that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded people 
with a right to privacy and liberty that extended to homosexual intercourse was a landmark in the 
movement for gay rights, especially as a direct rejection of the Court’s previous ruling in 
Bowers.
158
 At the time of Lawrence, in 2003, nine states continued to ban sodomy regardless of 
the sex of those engaging in the conduct, and four states prohibited only same-sex couples from 
engaging in anal and oral sex.
159
 Four decades earlier, every state in the nation had laws banning 
sodomy, so the Court did not necessarily act aggressively in this case, but the justice’s decision 
aligned with concurrent social and political change in American society.
160
 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court, explained that defendants, who had been convicted of sodomy in Texas, 
were entitled to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct as adults under the Constitution’s 
protection of liberty and privacy, founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.161 
He referred to Chief Justice Burger’s concurring opinion in Bowers, in which he said that, 
“condemnation of [homosexual practices] is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical 
standards,” to argue that “the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify 
its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual,” thus establishing that moral 
disapproval of homosexual conduct cannot provide a basis for government action,
162
 and, as 
Justice Scalia famously pointed out in a vehemently argued dissent, the Court’s reasoning in 
Lawrence has important implications for same-sex marriage as a constitutional matter.
163
 If 
moral disapproval cannot serve as a basis for denying same-sex couples privacy in their intimate 
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relations, Scalia reasons, how can it serve as a basis to deny them a right to marry in some future 
case?
164
 While he acknowledges that Kennedy wrote for the majority that the decision does not, 
“involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter,” Scalia argues that his is a “bald, unreasoned disclaimer” that 
defies the broader logic of the opinion, and that an earlier passage hints that Lawrence is indeed 
laying the groundwork for same-sex marriage.
165
 Earlier in the dissent, Kennedy writes that the 
Constitution protects “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education,” and he goes on to explain that “persons in a 
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons 
do.”166 In language that has been thoroughly referenced as the Perry and Windsor cases worked 
their way through the courts, Scalia argues that the Lawrence decision “dismantles the structure 
of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and 
homosexual unions…If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is ‘no legitimate state 
interest’ for purposes of proscribing that conduct…what justification could there possibly be for 
denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising ‘the liberty protected by the 
Constitution?’”167 After discussing the dangers of the Court’s decision in terms of its direct 
breadth and potential for future applicability, Scalia even argues that procreation, one of the 
major justifications that opponents of same-sex marriage use in place of moral disapproval of 
homosexuality to justify state denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples, cannot logically 
serve as such a justification “since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”168 He 
concludes that, “this case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one 
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entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this 
Court.”169 As Scalia has submitted, Lawrence is an essential case in the Court’s gay rights 
jurisprudence and will surely influence the future of same-sex marriage. 
Another major Supreme Court case dealing with gay rights matters was Romer v. Evans, 
in which the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that prohibited any 
protections for homosexuals as a group under law because it was not rationally related to any 
legitimate state interest.
170
 Justice Kennedy, again writing for the Court, begins in powerful 
fashion with a quote from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, saying that the 
Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”171 Getting to the merits of the 
Coloradoan constitutional amendment, Kennedy explained that, “We must conclude that 
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them 
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a 
stranger to its laws.”172 While the Court did not apply a standard of heightened scrutiny in this 
case, and the law was dismissed under a rational basis review, this decision does not preclude the 
possibility a heightened standard will be applied in the future. Because Justice Kennedy has been 
at the helm of two opinions that have marked major achievements in the gay rights movement, 
and because he is often viewed as the “swing vote” on a court that is otherwise viewed as having 
four solidly conservative and four solidly liberal justices, even though he is ideologically 
conservative in many respects, Kennedy is viewed as essential to the future of same-sex marriage 
in federal litigation, at least as long as he remains on the Supreme Court. 
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Justice Kennedy’s arguments in Romer and Lawrence were historic not only because they 
were the first times that the Supreme Court held in favor of gay rights, but also because they did 
so forcefully, empathetically, and articulately.
173
 Despite this, the implications of these decisions 
for same-sex marriage, and Justice Kennedy’s readiness to move forward on declaring a 
fundamental right to marriage for same-sex couples at this particular moment in time are 
unclear.
174
 By couching his decisions in broad terms such as “liberty,” “autonomy,” “dignity,” 
and “self-determination,” and narrowing the decisions as much as possible, Kennedy has brought 
gays and lesbians within the protection of the law and granted them humanity and justice in the 
eyes of the Supreme Court, while leaving broader questions about marriage and applicable 
standards of scrutiny open for future cases and, perhaps, a more appropriate “moment” in 
American history to address these questions.
175
 Whether or not the Windsor and Perry cases have 
presented Justice Kennedy and the remaining justices with that moment is perhaps the most 
repeated question surrounding the Supreme Court’s current term. On a personal level, it is well-
known that Kennedy is a libertarian “California establishment” Republican and that he knows 
and is friends with many gay people, but it is difficult to say that this will influence his decision, 
and it is more likely that his decision making will be influenced by his understanding of the law 
and his sense of the current readiness of society for same-sex marriage across the nation. 
176
 
Kennedy is acutely aware of the potentially negative impact of a premature and aggressive 
decision on same-sex marriage, but he is also aware of evolving social trends and the current 
political climate surrounding the issue.
177
 In Lawrence, Kennedy artfully phrased his view on the 
                                                          
173
 Lawrence C. Levine, Justice Kennedy's "Gay Agenda": Romer, Lawrence, and the Struggle for Marriage 






 David. G. Savage, Gay Marriage Fight May Hinge on Supreme Court's Anthony Kennedy, L.A. TIMES (February 
8, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/08/nation/la-na-marriage-kennedy-20120209. 
177
 Levine, supra note 173. 
36 
 
evolution of constitutional interpretation, in dicta that may become highly predictive of his future 
participation in decisions related to same-sex marriage, or of a future Court’s decision to do what 
he and his peers could not: 
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume 
to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truth and that later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only 
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke 




 As pundits continue to focus on Kennedy, many forget that Chief Justice John Roberts is 
the leader of the Court, nearly 20 years his junior, potentially intellectually flexible, and 
therefore concerned about his and the Court’s legacy on controversial civil rights issues. Further, 
he is likely understanding of the fact that any decision involving gay rights today may face him 
again five, ten, fifteen, twenty, or even thirty years in the future, and not a predictable vote in any 
direction, as he proved in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.
179
 In that 
decision, many legal analysts speculated that Roberts felt a great deal of pressure in his role as 
Chief Justice to preserve the legacy of the Court as a judicial institution free from the lowly and 
unpopular game of partisan politics currently entangling the other branches of government; they 
argued that he feared a decision dismantling the Affordable Healthcare Act, President Obama’s 
signature legislative achievement, would be seen by many as conservative judicial activism.
180
 
This emphasis on legacy, and on the responsibilities of being Chief Justice, will also weight on 
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his decision making in the context of same-sex marriage.
181
 As a relatively young man at fifty-
eight, it is not inconceivable that he could be serving on the Supreme Court for another two to 
three decades, which is an extremely long time in the court of public opinion. A decision against 
same-sex marriage now would almost certainly be faced with reversal during his tenure, as the 
Bowers finding that laws against sodomy were constitutional was reversed after only 17 years, 
and the current rate of increase in polls for same-sex marriage is rapid. At an increase of about 
1.5 percent a year, according to some estimates, that could mean public support for same-sex 
marriage at about 70 percent when he is in his mid-seventies.
182
 Of course, public opinion is not 
the only factor that the Chief Justice Roberts will consider in making determinations about same-
sex marriage, but his focus on legacy, his relative youth, and the pervasive and rapid shifts in 
opinion on gay rights occurring in American society are certain to influence his thought process 
as he questions whether or not he wants to lead the Supreme Court against the overwhelming 
course of social progress. Further, there is evidence that Roberts is open to the cause of gay 
rights, as he performed pro bono legal work for the gay activist groups behind the Romer case in 
1996, to the extent that he was “instrumental in reviewing filings and preparing oral 
arguments.”183 While attorneys may not necessarily agree with every client for whom they work, 
this information is just another piece of information that may be helpful in evaluating the Chief 
Justice’s sense of the gay rights movement. 
 Even though oral arguments have historically proven to be ineffective measures of 
ultimate conclusions, the oral argument in the Perry and Windsor cases allowed the justices to 
give some hints as to issues of concern and their possible intentions. In relation to DOMA, 










Justice Kagan took issue with Congress’ stated intention of expressing moral disapproval for 
homosexuality through the law, perhaps implicating Lawrence and suggesting that this was an 
inappropriate basis for a government action.
184
 Justice Ginsburg said that DOMA created an 
environment where opposite-sex couples who were married were entitled to all benefits under 
federal law and therefore had “full marriages,” whereas same-sex couples who were married 
were not and therefore had “skim milk marriages.”185 While the liberal justices focused on equal 
protection matters, Justice Kennedy focused on issues related to federalism, saying that there was 
potentially a federal “conflict with what has always been the essence of state police power, 
which is to regulate marriage, divorce, custody.”186 Though consensus might not be reached on 
every issue, DOMA seemed to be at a very real risk of being overturned, at least based on the 
questions posed by the justices, but this is perhaps the least predictable and reliable measure.
187
 
According to reports by the news media, at least, the justices seemed far more poised to strike 
down DOMA than they did to issue a broad opinion in the Perry case.
188
 
 At oral argument in the Perry case, Justice Kennedy was decidedly reserved and noted 
that Olson and Boies were asking the Court to go into “uncharted waters” by declaring that 
same-sex couples had a fundamental right to marry.
189
 He noted that uncharted waters might be 
considered a positive or a negative metaphor, but suggested that the Court might have made a 
mistake in even granting the case, hinting at issues with standing related to the intervening 
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defendants in the case.
190
 Some analysts have noted that dismissing the case for lack of standing 
may be a way for the Court to get out of having to make a prematurely broad decision, or an 
uneven and awkward decision, while still making certain that same-sex couples in California are 
ultimately given the right to marry, and leaving the door open to a future case when the 
incremental approach has taken hold in more states.
191
 How much can truly be taken out of oral 
arguments is hard to know, and the media is largely speculative, but the line of questioning 
utilized by the justices is informative nonetheless. 
Given these considerations, legal analysts have speculated that the Court will likely 
proceed in the Perry case with one of five options.
192
 They speculate that the Court could 1) 
uphold Proposition 8, thus allowing states to limit civil marriage to opposite-sex couples; 2) the 
Court could hold that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees prohibit states 
from denying same-sex couples marriage licenses – the widest possible option; 3) the Court 
could find that, once states have offered same-sex couples all or most of the “incidents of 
marriage” that are offered to similarly situated opposite-sex couples, there is no purpose for 
denying same-sex couples the status of “marriage” other than to stigmatize them on the basis of 
their sexual orientation, thus affecting only the eight states that already extend to same-sex 
couples civil unions, but not marriage; 4) the Court could follow the court of appeals and hold 
that a state cannot remove a right to marry once it has given that right and virtually all of the 
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incidents of marriage already given to similarly situated opposite-sex couples; or 5) the Court 




As the Supreme Court has established time and time again, civil marriage is one of life’s 
most important processes, and it is the choice of two individuals to formally commit their love to 
one another, to form a family, and to build a shared life, that makes the institution important to 
broader society from a secular and practical perspective. While it would be valuable to other gay 
rights causes for the Court to apply an intermediate or heightened scrutiny standard to 
government classifications based on sexual orientation, it seems unnecessary for the Court to 
apply these standards for the purpose of finding state prohibitions of same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional, as there can be no rational basis for such laws. As Judge Walker’s thorough 
district court opinion found in the Perry case, the reasons presented by governments for these 
bans, from preserving the institution of marriage, to tradition, morality, condemnation of 
homosexuality, “protecting” children, and various other religious reasons are simply not 
legitimate state reasons for discriminating against homosexuals. The extensive trial record 
established by Judge Walker provides direct evidence that homosexuality is simply not a choice, 
that homosexuals form loving bonds in the same way that heterosexuals do, and the 
overwhelming judgment of the sociological and medical community is that children from same-
sex homes do just as well as children from traditional families. As for tradition and religious 
views, it is important to note that these are concepts to be respected, and those that revere them 
should not be roundly denounced as bigots or intolerant simply because they do not support 
same-sex marriage, but their belief systems do not justify discrimination under the Constitution. 





Similarly, the Constitution assures religious groups that they will never have to recognize 
marriages of which they do not approve, and this is just as proper as the government treating all 
citizens equally under the law. Having said that, my opinion on same-sex marriage, equal 
protection, and the Constitution will not convince the Supreme Court, and the question of which 
strategy for doing that is better – the incremental or the aggressive – is more another issue 
entirely. 
As a theoretical matter, the incremental approach appears to have a more historically-
based, logical approach, whereas the aggressive standpoint tends to be more emotional. 
Incrementalists like Eskridge look to the historical tendency of the Supreme Court to proceed 
incrementally, and the dangers of proceeding aggressively, to suggest that the movement benefits 
by proceeding cautiously. Those that advocate the aggressive approach often argue that same-sex 
couples deserve marriage equality now and, therefore, a reserved strategy is inappropriate. 
Legally, aggressive activists are in the right, but incrementalists have a stronger, more logic-
based theoretical approach in this regard. Despite the fact that the incrementalist method appears 
to approach same-sex marriage litigation from more solid footing than the aggressive approach, 
the incrementalist position does successfully apply its own reasoning. Incrementalists argue that 
the Supreme Court’s past incremental tendencies, the risks of aggressive decisions like Roe, and 
the danger of a negative decision necessitate caution, but these arguments don’t survive 
application to the dynamics of the same-sex marriage issue in 2013, although they might have 
mere months ago. 
While it is impossible to know what the Court will do in June, it seems likely that DOMA 
may be at an end, as the Court can proceed incrementally with the Windsor case. With Perry, the 
Court seems unlikely to proceed aggressively, but this does not mean aggressive activists have 
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failed. As long as the Court does not deal a setback to the marriage equality movement, the 
argument that Perry was too aggressive does not hold water, and, while the oral arguments 
seemed to suggest the Court is not prepared to release a sweeping decision on same-sex marriage 
this term, the current balance of the Court, and ongoing social trends make it highly unlikely that 
the Court will do anything but delay deciding the issue until some future case, or issue a limited 
holding. When the Supreme Court proceeded incrementally in the civil rights era, the country 
was far more divided, as the polling data discussed earlier suggests. While the number of states 
with same-sex marriage is close, though not equal, to the number of states with liberal abortion 
laws at the time of the Roe decision, the analogy simply does not hold up because the issue is 
fundamentally different. For pro-life activists, abortion will always be murder, whereas same-sex 
marriage hardly affects the lives of those not involved in it, and the polling data reflects a 
seemingly unstoppable trend of growing support, while abortion has remained divisive for 
decades. While a sweeping decision like Roe may be improbable at this time, a similar cultural 
backlash would be highly unlikely and, if it did result, it would be short-lived. Thus, while the 
incremental approach tends to follow a more rational thought process, it fails in this instance 
largely because an aggressive ruling would not be damaging in the way that past aggressive 
rulings were, because social trends mean the Court is uniquely situated to rule differently than 
the Court has in similar situations, and because the current court is highly unlikely to rule against 
the gay rights movement, even though it is not likely to rule particularly aggressively in favor of 
the gay rights movement. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
At stake in the Windsor and Perry cases is the quality of life for millions of real people, 
just trying to live and love like every other American they know. For those who have dedicated 
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their lives to the gay rights movement, the issue of same-sex marriage is deeply felt. The 
controversy between those that advocate for an aggressive litigation strategy and those that 
advocate for an incremental one, it surely must be noted, is not one between opponents, but one 
between unquestionable allies, so passionate about this keystone concern that its future must be 
pursued with vigorous internal debate such that mistakes can be corrected and a path forward can 
be forged regardless of what may happen in the states, in the court system, and beyond. This 
paper is designed as a roadmap to explore this internal debate, so that a path forward can be 
forged when the Supreme Court releases its decisions in June of 2013, because the gay rights 
movement will unite and continue to rally forward towards a day when the promise of equality 
and justice for all is truly realized. 
For her part, Edie Windsor isn’t worried: “We did our homework, and we got here, and 
it’s joyous to be here,” she said on the steps of the Supreme Court in March.194 “I think we’ll win 
if there’s justice. But if it doesn’t happen this time, it will happen next time or the next. But it 
will happen.”195 
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